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INTRODUCTION

Congress recently codified the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction in the federal courts' in response to the United States Supreme
Court's severe restriction of the doctrine in Finley v. United States. 2 In
so doing, Congress revitalized the doctrine of pendent partyjurisdic1. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650 § 310, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 5104, 5113-14 (to

be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367) [hereinafter Implementation Act].
Public Law 10 1-650, entitled the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, contains
eight titles which range in subjects from Civil Justice Reform (Title I) and Judicial
Discipline (Title IV) to Copyright Protection for Architectural Works (Title VII) and
Rental of Computer Software Programs (Title VIII). How these last two subjects
relate to judicial improvements is a question which is beyond the scope of this note.
The Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 is contained in
Title III.
2. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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tion and the doctrine's tumultuous history should now come to a
close.
The codification of pendent party jurisdiction is of particular importance to plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit. While the Finley decision
sharply curtailed the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction in all federal courts, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals effectively eliminated the doctrine altogether in the Eighth Circuit when the court
interpreted Finley in Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railroad.3
The need for congressional action is best illustrated by analyzing
the dilemma faced by plaintiffs who have mixed federal and state law
claims but who are denied pendent party jurisdiction. Leland Lockard's situation presents a good example of this difficulty. The facts
which gave rise to the court's decision in Lockard present an interesting case study of how the doctrine as it is now codified may be applied in the future.
Leland Lockard worked in Nebraska for the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac) as a fireman for a local MoPac train crew.4
Rosella Ray owned a boarding house under contract with MoPac to
provide lodging facilities for MoPac train crews. 5 On the morning of
December 15, 1984, Leland Lockard slipped and fell down the steps
of Rosella Ray's boarding house and injured his back and hip.6
Lockard brought an action against MoPac under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).7 Lockard also sued Ray for negligence
under Nebraska law, and his wife brought suit against Ray under Nebraska law for loss of consortium.8 No diversity of citizenship existed between the Lockards and Ray. Thus, no independent basis for
federal jurisdiction existed for the negligence action against Ray.9
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska allowed
all claims to proceed, and a jury found for the Lockards on each
claim and awarded them damages.1O
3. 894 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990).
4. Id. at 300.
5. Id. Ray, whose boarding house was located in Crete, Nebraska, had a one
year written agreement with the railroad to "'furnish, maintain and operate motel
lodging facilities' " and to provide around the clock motel management. Id. (quoting

the written agreement).
6. Leland Lockard and his crew arrived in Crete at approximately 10:00 at night
on December 14, and checked into Ray's boarding house. Four to five inches of snow
had fallen by the time the crew arrived. The next morning a thin glaze of ice covered
the boarding house steps. At 6:30 a.m. Lockard left the boarding house to eat breakfast, then returned to his room. When he left his room at 7:15 a.m. to report for
work, he slipped on the top step and fell down the steps. Id.
7. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 301. The plaintiffs, Leland and Lynette Lockard, never asserted that
diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) existed between the parties. Id. at 301 n.2.
10. Id. at 300. The jury awarded $600,000 for the FELA claim against MoPac,
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MoPac and Ray appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated the judgment against Ray and ruled that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state claims raised against
Ray by the Lockards.l" The court held that the Supreme Court's
1989 decision in Finley v. United States 12 precluded pendent party jurisdiction over the Lockards' claims against Ray.m3
The Lockard decision all but extinguished the doctrine of pendent
party jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit. Congress then acted in response to problems such as those illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railroad. Although congressional action came too late for the Lockards, future litigants will benefit from the new legislation.
This Note traces the historical development of pendent party jurisdiction and examines the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United
States. The Note examines the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Lockard
and the court's restrictive interpretation of Finley, which effectively
eliminated pendent party jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit. The potential ramifications, if Congress had chosen not to act, are also considered. Finally, the Note explores the limitations and probable
effects of Congress' codification of the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction, and the limitations and probable effects of Congress'
action.
I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PENDENT
PARTY JURISDICTION

A.

Pendent Claim Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The United
States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to those types of
cases described in Article III, Section 2,14 which empowers Congress
reduced by a finding of twenty percent negligence, and $200,000 for the claim
against Ray, reduced by twenty-five percent for contributory negligence. The jury
also awarded Lynette Lockard $50,000 for loss of consortium. Id.
11. Id. at 303. None of the parties raised the issue of the federal court's jurisdiction over Ray. The issue was raised for the first time by the court of appeals at oral
argument. Id. at 301 n.l. The court held that the issue must be evaluated in light of
Finley. Id. at 301. The parties briefed the jurisdictional issue, and the court decided
Lockard on January 19, 1990. Id. at 299.
12. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
13. Lockard, 894 F.2d at 301-03.
14. The Constitution provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-
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to establish the "inferior" federal courts.' 5 Consequently, federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction only where the Constitution allows
or where Congress has supplied such jurisdiction by statute. 16
Over the years, these jurisdictional limitations posed a problem for
the federal courts in cases involving both federal and state law
claims.17 Tension arose between the jurisdictional limitations of the
federal courts and the notions of judicial economy and convenience.
Federal courts needed an instrument by which they could join jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims with related, jurisdictionally
sufficient claims which were properly in federal court. To fulfill this
need, federal courts developed the doctrine of pendent claim jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, federal courts may join jurisdictionally
sufficient claims with related state law claims which, by themselves,
are jurisdictionally insufficient.18
The origins of pendent claim jurisdiction date back at least to
1933.19 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,20 the United States Supreme
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
A federal court has the capacity to exercise jurisdiction over cases within the nine
categories enumerated above. Congress cannot authorize federal court jurisdiction
in cases not within these nine categories. See Comment, Pendent PartyJurisdictionAfter
Finley v. United States: A Trend Toward Its Abolition, 24 GA. L. REV. 447, 449 (1990).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
16. See Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868).
As regards all courts of the United States inferior to [the Supreme Court],
two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate.
The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an
act of Congress must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to
vest it.

Id. (quoted in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989)).
17. See Comment, supra note 15, at 450-51.
18. Id.
19. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Hum involved a federal copyright
claim and a state unfair competition claim. Both claims arose out of identical facts.
The Supreme Court held that a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over both
claims as long as the federal claim was substantial. In so ruling, the Court adopted
the following test:
The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct grounds
in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents
a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former,
where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the
federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground; in the
latter it may not do so upon the non-federal cause of action.
Id. at 246 (emphasis in original). For a more detailed discussion of the origin of
pendent jurisdiction, see Comment, supra note 14, at 450-52.
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Court adopted the current standard to determine whether pendent
claims are sufficiently related to the underlying cause of action.21
Under Gibbs, a federal court may exercise pendent claim jurisdiction
whenever "the federal and non-federal claims 'derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' and 'are such that a plaintiff would
ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding.' "22
The Constitution permits pendent claim jurisdiction only in cases
which meet the Gibbs standard.23
B.

Pendent PartyJurisdiction

Pendent party jurisdiction24 evolved from and expanded the more
established doctrine of pendent claim jurisdiction. Under pendent
20. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
21. Id. at 725.
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense ofjudicial power, exists whenever there is a
claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ...." and the
relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion
that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
.case." The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard
to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of federal issues, there is power in the federal courts to
hear the whole.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation and footnotes omitted).
22. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
725).
23. Id. at 548-49.
24. The doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction should not be confused with the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Although the two doctrines are related, they are
nevertheless distinct and serve different purposes. "Traditionally, ancillary jurisdiction refers to joinder, usually by a party other than the plaintiff, of additional claims
and parties added after the plaintiff's claim has been filed." Alumax Mill Prods. v.
Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1004 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Baylis v. Marriott
Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1988)). Ancillary jurisdiction usually arises in complex multiple party litigation involving third-party defendants, compulsory counterclaims, and cross-claims. Ancillary jurisdiction is primarily a mechanism used by
defendants and third parties whose interests would be inadequately protected if their
claims were disallowed in the ongoing federal case. Id.
Section 1367 does not distinguish between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
Instead, the two concepts are lumped together under the term "supplemental jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1991). See Mengler, The Demise of Pendent andAncillaryJurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247. "Most commentators believe that there is
no meaningful distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The literature
has come to refer to these jurisdictional bases as supplemental jurisdiction." Id. at
247 n.3 (citations omitted). Mengler was a consultant to the Federal Courts Study
Committee and prepared a previous version of the article for the Committee. Id. at
247. The author obviously won the respect of the Committee; the Committee and
ultimately Congress adopted both the term "supplemental jurisdiction" and the author's proposal to codify pendent party jurisdiction. See also Mengler, Burbank &
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party jurisdiction, a pendent state claim may be appended to a claim
which is jurisdictionally proper in federal court but asserted against a
different party.2 5 While the federal courts readily accepted pendent
claim jurisdiction, the concept of pendent party jurisdiction was not
similarly embraced.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Finley, the Court's approach toward pendent party jurisdiction was inconsistent. While
implicitly recognizing the doctrine, the Court had not expressly approved of the doctrine's use. 26 Prior to Finley, the Supreme Court
twice avoided ruling on the issue of pendent party jurisdiction. In
Moor v. County ofAlameda,27 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
resolve the dispute among the circuit courts over the issue of pendent party jurisdiction. Despite the opportunity to resolve the issue,
which the Court termed "a subtle and complex question with far
reaching implications," the Court decided the case on other
grounds.2 8 Two years later, in Philbrook v. Glodgett,29 the Court had
another opportunity to rule on the issue of pendent party jurisdiction and again chose to avoid this "subtle and complex question."o
Rowe, Jr., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify SuppleimentalJurisdiction,74
JUDICATURE

213 (1991).

25. See Comment, supra note 14, at 454. "This jurisdictional expansion has
sometimes been justified as a combination of the Gibbs' more flexible approach toward pendency and the expansion of ancillarity over new parties to the action." Id.
(footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 455-56.
27. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
28. Id. at 715. In Moor, the plaintiff suffered injuries when a county deputy sheriff discharged a shotgun to quell a civil disturbance. The plaintiff brought suit against
the individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. In addition, the plaintiff brought an action against the county based on a California law. The district court
rejected the plaintiff's pendent jurisdiction arguments and dismissed his claims
against the county. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Moor v.
Madagan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
On appeal, the Supreme Court managed to sidestep the issue of pendent party
jurisdiction:
Whether there exists judicial power to hear the state law claims against the
county is, in short, a subtle and complex question with far-reaching implications. But we do not consider it appropriate to resolve this difficult issue in
the present case, for we have concluded that even assuming, arguendo, the
existence of power to hear the claim, the District Court, in exercise of its
legitimate discretion, properly declined to join the claims against the county
in these suits.
Moor, 411 U.S. at 715.
29. 421 U.S. 707 (1975).
30. In Philbrook, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the defendant under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Although the defendant briefed
this issue, the Court, again with great effort, avoided the issue of pendent party jurisdiction. Id. at 720. In denying the appeal of the pendent party, the Court concluded
as follows:
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In 1976, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of pendent
party jurisdiction in Aldinger v. Howard.3' In Aldinger, a fired county
worker brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several individual defendants and appended a related state claim against
Spokane County, Washington.32 The Court held that the district
court did not have statutory jurisdiction to join a municipal corporation in order to assert a state law claim.33
While the Aldinger plaintiff's claims unquestionably met the
Court's "common nucleus" standard under Gibbs, the Court held
that when a completely new party is added, a significant legal difference exists and further analysis is necessary. 34 The Supreme Court
concluded that "[rlesolution of a claim of pendent party jurisdiction
calls for careful attention to the relevant statutory language."35 Accordingly, the Court examined the jurisdictional statute behind section 1983.36 The Court reasoned that because section 1983
precluded direct action against counties, an action could not be
brought against a county indirectly by means of pendent party
jurisdiction.37
The exercise of the District Court's jurisdiction over the [pendent party]...

resulted in no adjudication on the merits that could not have been just as
properly made without the [pendent party], and has resulted in no issuance
of process against [him] which he has properly contended to be wrongful
before this Court.
Id. at 722.
31. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. Id. at 3-5. At the time Aldinger was decided, a federal claim based on section
1983 was unavailable against the county because counties were "excluded from the
'person[s]' answerable to the plaintiff" under section 1983 and were thus excluded
from liability under the statute. Id. at 16 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 18790 (1961)). The Supreme Court later overruled Monroe in Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
33. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
34. Id. at 14-15 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
35. Id. at 17. Before a federal court may assert pendent party jurisdiction, that
court "must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the
statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence." Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (1988) provides jurisdiction for section 1983
(1988) claims as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person... [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
Id. § 134 3 (a).
37. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17. The majority stated:
Parties such as counties, whom Congress excluded from liability in § 1983,
and therefore by reference in the grant ofjurisdiction under § 1343(3), can
argue with a great deal of force that the scope of that "civil action" over
which the district courts have been given statutory jurisdiction should not be
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Two years after Aldinger, the Supreme Court again faced the issue
of pendent party jurisdiction in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.S8 The plaintiff in Owen brought a negligence claim in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 133239 based on diversity between the parties.40 After the district court granted the original defendant's summary judgment motion, the only claims which remained were against
a non-diverse third-party defendant. Because the Court held that
section 1332 required "complete diversity," the Court refused to apply pendent party jurisdiction to avoid this requirement and dis4
missed the case. '
The Court in Aldinger and Owen appeared to recognize the doctrine
of pendent party jurisdiction. However, the Court refused to apply
the doctrine when the jurisdiction-conferring statute either expressly
or implicitly denied such jurisdiction. The Court's focus on statutory
interpretation led to a split among the circuit courts of appeals regarding pendent party jurisdiction. Only the Ninth Circuit has categorically refused to recognize the doctrine.42 The other circuits,
which had accepted the idea of pendent party jurisdiction, had differences of opinion as to the proper application of the doctrine.
For instance, the Second4S and Fifth44 Circuit Courts of Appeals
so broadly read as to bring them back within that power merely because the

facts also give rise to an ordinary civil action against them under state law.
Id. (emphasis in original).
38. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
39. Federal jurisdiction exists over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds... $50,000... and is between ... citizens of different States ....28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988). The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as requiring complete diversity among the parties. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 367-69.
40. Owen, 437 U.S. at 373-74. In Owen, a woman who lived in Iowa sued for the
wrongful death of her husband. Her husband was electrocuted when the crane next
to which he was walking struck a high tension power line. Plaintiff originally brought
her action in the district court of Nebraska against the Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD). Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity, because OPPD was a Nebraska
corporation and the plaintiff was a citizen of Iowa. Id. at 367. OPPD filed a third
party complaint against Owen Equipment and Erection Co., owners and operators of
the crane. Id. at 367-68. The district court granted OPPD's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 368. Owen admitted in its answer that it was a Nebraska corporation. Id. at 369. However, it was later disclosed that Owen's principal place of business was Iowa, not Nebraska. Owen then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Both the district court and the court of appeals denied Owen's motion
to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 377.
41. Id. at 373-76.
42. See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200, 1200 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977)

(reaffirming rejection of pendent party jurisdiction doctrine after Aldinger).
43. See Weinberger v. Kendrich, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982). "The exclusivity of
federal jurisdiction over claims of violations of the Securities Exchange Act makes a
federal court the only one where a complete disposition of federal and related state

claims can be rendered." Id. at 76.
44. See Smith v. National Flood Ins. Program, 796 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1986). "An
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applied the doctrine only when the federal statute granted the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. Other circuit courts were less restrictive in their acceptance of pendent party jurisdiction. The
Seventh,45 Eighth,46 and District of Columbia47 Circuit Courts of
Appeals applied pendent party jurisdiction as long as its application
did not result in an elimination of diversity when diversity was the
jurisdictional basis for the federal claim.
C. Finley v. United States
In 1989, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the split among
the circuits by further refining and restricting the use of pendent
party jurisdiction. In Finley v. United States,48 the plaintiff's husband
and two children were killed when their plane crashed into power
lines near a San Diego airport. The plaintiff originally sued the city
of San Diego, alleging that the city negligently maintained and operated the airport's runway lights. The plaintiff also brought an action
against the San Diego Gas and Electric Company alleging negligent
placement of the power lines.4 9 The plaintiff later learned that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was actually responsible for
maintaining the runway lights.5O
The plaintiff filed suit against the FAA in federal district court
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence by
the FAA.51 The plaintiff later moved to amend her federal complaint
to include the claims against the original defendants. No independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed between the plaintiff and the
original defendants.52 The district court granted the plaintiff's motion but certified an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals on the issue of pendent party jurisdiction.53 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that the FTCA did not permit pendent
independent basis of jurisdiction must support state law claim ...when the plaintiff
wishes to assert that state law claim against a pendent party in federal court." Id. at

92 (citation omitted).
45. See Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1987). "[Wie recognize 'pendent

party' jurisdiction where the main claim is a federal-question rather than diversity
claim." Id. at 1119 (citing Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336,
1360-61 (7th Cir. 1985) (approving pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 case)).
46. See North Dakota v. Merchants Nat'il Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 370-74
(8th Cir. 1980) (following Aldinger).
47. See Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 412-17 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
48. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
49. Id. at 546.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 546-47.
52. Id. Both the plaintiff and the original state court defendants were residents
of California and thus were non-diverse parties. This eliminated any independent
basis for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 547.
53. Id. at 546-47. The interlocutory appeal was certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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party jurisdiction.54 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that pendent party jurisdiction was unavailable
under the FTCA.55
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the analysis by citing
two prerequisites for creating jurisdiction: "The Constitution must
have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress
must have supplied it."56 The Court relied on United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs57 and the constitutional requirements for pendent jurisdiction.58 The Court assumed, without deciding, that the constitutional
criteria for pendent party and pendent claim jurisdiction were the
same. 59 The Court conceded that the plaintiff's claims met the constitutional criteria necessary for pendent claim jurisdiction. The majority, however, went on to state that "with respect to the addition of
§ 1292(b) (1988). Finley, 490 U.S. at 547. Section 1292(b) addresses the jurisdiction

of federal appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C § 1292(b) (emphasis in original).
54. Finley, 490 U.S. at 547. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on its
holding in Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), which held that the
FTCA expressly rejected pendent party jurisdiction. Finley, 490 U.S. at 547.
55. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. The FTCA grants to the federal district courts jurisdiction over "civil actions on claims against the United States ...caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
56. Finley, 490 U.S. at 548 (quoting Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252
(1868)) (emphasis added).
57. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Not surprisingly, the Court in Finley omitted language
from Gibbs which appeared to invite federal court assertion of pendent party
jurisdiction:
The State and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected
to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of
the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
Id. at 725 (emphasis in original). The Court in Gibbs also stated:
While it is commonplace that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they do embody "the whole
tendency of our decisions ...to require a plaintiff to try his... whole case at
one time," and to that extent emphasize the basis of pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 725 n.13 (citations omitted).
58. Finley, 490 U.S. at 548-49.
59. Id. at 549.
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different parties, as opposed to different claims, we will not assume
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly." 60
The Court then examined the language of the FTCA and held that
it precluded jurisdiction over defendants other than the United
States.61 While the issues in Finley were limited to FTCA's jurisdictional grant, the majority's language implied a broader rule. Justice
Scalia concluded with an "interpretive rule," stating, "a grant of jurisdiction over additional claims involving particular parties does not
itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties."62

The analysis adopted by the Court in Finley was inconsistent with
that used in Aldinger and Owen. Under the earlier analysis, federal
courts could exercise pendent party jurisdiction unless the pertinent
jurisdictional grant indicated a congressional intent to negate pendent jurisdiction.63 In contrast, the analysis in Finley suggested that
pendent party jurisdiction under a particular statute existed only
where Congress intended to grant such jurisdiction. This decision
unquestionably limited the use of pendent party jurisdiction.
It remained to be seen whether the lower courts would interpret
Finley merely as a further restriction on pendent party jurisdiction or
as an effective elimination of the doctrine. In Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,64 the court of appeals' interpretation of Finley may have
sounded the death knell for pendent party jurisdiction in the Eighth
Circuit. It was only through an act of Congress that the doctrine was
revived in the Eighth Circuit.
D. Pendent PartyJurisdictionin the Eighth Circuit Prior to Finley
Prior to Finley, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had recognized
the power of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over pendent par60. Id. at 549-50. The Court cited three cases in which pendent party jurisdiction was denied: Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1973) (refusing to allow a plaintiff seeking diversity action with less than $10,000 to append
claims to other jurisdictionally sufficient claims of plaintiff class); Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 38-41); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 31-37). Finley, 490 U.S. at 549-50.
61. Finley, 490 U.S. at 552-54. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (jurisdictional language of the FTCA). The majority concluded that " 'against the United
States' means against the United States and no one else." Finley, 490 U.S. at 552.
62. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
63. See, e.g., Aldinger, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). "Before it can be concluded that such
jurisdiction exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it,
but that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence." Id. at 18.
64. 894 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990).
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ties. In North Dakota v. MerchantsNational Bank & Trust Co. ,65 decided
in 1980, the Eighth Circuit approved the application of pendent
party jurisdiction. In Merchants, the underlying dispute arose when
the Comptroller of the Currency, under section thirty of the National
Bank Act, 66 granted the defendant banks permission to change their
names to "First Bank of North Dakota" of the city or town where the
bank was located. 67 The state, which operated its central financial
institution under the name, "Bank of North Dakota," objected to the
name change.
The state sued the Comptroller and the defendant banks in federal
court seeking review of the Comptroller's decision and an injunction
preventing the banks from changing their names. The district court
upheld the Comptroller's decision. The state appealed the district
court's decision to dismiss the state's unfair competition claims
against five defendant banks. The state argued that it had pleaded a
claim of state common law unfair competition and that the district
court had ignored the pendent claim. The court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. Upon remand, the district court held that the National Bank Act preempted
the state's unfair competition claim and dismissed the suit.68
The state again appealed. Although not raised as an issue by
either party, the Eighth Circuit began its analysis by questioning the
district court's jurisdiction to hear the state law claims against the
defendant banks. The court ultimately analyzed the issue as one of
pendent party jurisdiction rather than pendent claim jurisdiction. 69
The court distinguished the jurisdictional statute underlying the
65. 634 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1980).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 30 (1976) (relevant provision repealed by 12 U.S.C. § 301

(1988)).
67. Merchants, 634 F.2d at 369.
68. Id. at 370.
69. Id. The court stated:

The difficulty with finding pendent jurisdiction in the present case
stems less from the nature of the claims themselves than from the fact that
the two claims involved different defendants. If the difference in defendants
is for the moment disregarded, it is clear that the case satisfied the constitutional requirements of pendent jurisdiction as set out in United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966). First, the
claim arising under federal law was jurisdictionally "substantial." Second,
the federal and state claims had a "common nucleus of operative fact" in the
defendant banks' adoption of new names and the Comptroller's approval
thereof. And third, plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try both claims
in one proceeding because a single interest of plaintiff's was affected.
Id. (footnote omitted). The court then acknowledged that the claims met the requirements of Gibbs but added, "Remaining is the question whether pendent jurisdiction
of the unfair competition claim existed despite the fact that the defendants to that
claim, the appellee banks, were not parties to the claim for review of the Comptroller's decision, upon which federal jurisdiction was based." Id. at 371.
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state's federal claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a),7o from the jurisdictional
statute behind 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the Supreme Court addressed in Aldinger. The court noted that the "Supreme Court has
not yet indicated whether pendent party jurisdiction may be exercised when primary jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (a)."71 Although section 1331 (a) did not contain an exclusive
jurisdictional grant, the court was "convinced that pendent party jurisdiction was not barred in this case." 7 2
Thus, prior to Finley, the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction was
alive and well in the Eighth Circuit. Despite Finley, other circuit
courts of appeals also kept the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction
alive." However, the court's decision in Lochard temporarily left in
doubt the survival of pendent party jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit.

II.

LOCKARD V. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD

A.

Statement of the Case

Writing for the majority 74 in Lockard, Chief Judge Lay began by
asserting that Finley would control the court's analysis. 75 The majority held that under Finley "pendent party jurisdiction exists only
where Congress affirmatively granted such jurisdiction."76 Once the
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provided as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no such sum or value shall be required
in any such action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or
any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
Id. (amended in 1980 to delete the amount in controversy requirement).
71. Merchants, 634 F.2d at 373 (quoting Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St.
Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 789 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979)).
72. Id.

73. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing post-Finley cases
which have authorized the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction).
74. Judge Arnold joined Chief Judge Lay in the majority with Judge Beam concurring in part and dissenting in part. Lockard v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 894 F.2d 299,
305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990).
75. Id. at 301.
76. Id. (citing Finley, 490 U.S. at 553). The words "affirmative grant" were not
used in the Court's holding in Finley. The majority in Lockard alluded to this fact in a
footnote as follows:
The petitioner in Finley attempted to find an "affirmative grant" ofjurisdiction by reason of the change made in the comprehensive 1948 revision of
the Judicial Code. The Court specifically rejected this argument. The Court
stated: "The statute here defines jurisdiction in a manner that does not
reach defendants other than the United States."
Id. at 301 n.7 (quoting Finley, 490 U.S. at 553). The Lockard court noted that Justice
Blackmun, in his dissent in Finley, recognized that the Court's holding in Finley turned
on the issue of whether an affirmative grant of jurisdiction appeared in the statute.
He disagreed that this should be the issue, stating:
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majority adopted this interpretation of Finley, the rest of its analysis
was academic.
This result required the court to read into Finley a nearly complete
proscription of pendent party jurisdiction, an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation. The majority in Lockard chose to rely on dicta
from Finley to form the court's interpretive rule. Other commentators had interpreted Finley as requiring that a statute affirmatively
grant pendent party jurisdiction.77 Thus, criticism of Lockard might
be interpreted as merely blamirig the messenger. However, because
the Finley Court never explicitly mentioned an "affirmative grant" requirement in its holding, there was no need for the Eighth Circuit to
read an "affirmative grant" requirement into Finley. In fact, the
Court stated in Finley the limitations of its decision when reiterating
its purpose for granting certiorari: "We granted certiorari . . . to
resolve a split among the circuits on whether the FTCA permits an
assertion of pendent jurisdiction over additional parties." 78 Thus
the Eighth Circuit could have interpreted Finley as applying solely to
the FTCA, while remaining faithful to the Court's decision.
The plaintiffs in Lockard argued that the jurisdictional grant of the
FELA was broader than the jurisdictional grant of the FTCA, and
that Finley should not apply. Not surprisingly, the court of appeals
disagreed. The majority compared the FELA's jurisdictional language with that of the FTCA and found the language under the
FELA no less restrictive than that of the FTCA. 79 The majority arIfAldinger v. Howard... required us to ask whether the Federal Tort Claims

Act embraced "an affirmative grant of pendent-party jurisdiction," . . . I
would agree with the majority that no such specific grant of jurisdiction is
present. But, in my view, that is not the appropriate question under Aldinger.
I read the Court's opinion in that case, rather, as requiring us to consider
whether Congress has demonstrated an intent to exempt "the party as to
whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim" is asserted from being
haled into federal court.
Id. at 302 n.7 (quoting Finley, 490 U.S. at 566-67 (Blackmun,J., dissenting)) (emphasis in original). Thus, the Eighth Circuit's holding that pendent party jurisdiction
does not exist without an affirmative grant from Congress is based on dicta in Finley
and drawn from the Finley dissent's characterization of Finley.
77. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.2 (Supp. 1991).

It was possible to read Finley as only a construction of the Federal Tort
Claims Act ....
It seemed clear, however, that this reading of Finley was too
narrow. A fairer reading was that the Court was distinguishing sharply between pendent claims and pendent parties. Although the Finley Court assumed, without deciding, that pendent party jurisdiction would be within
the constitutional grant of judicial power, it held that "an affirmative grant
of pendent-party jurisdiction" must be found in a statute.
Id. Another commentator summed up Finley this way: "In effect, the Finley Court
declared Gibbs brain dead, but refused to discontinue life support." Perdue, Finley v.
United States: Unstringing PendentJurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539, 568 (1990).

78. Finley, 490 U.S. at 547.
79. The Court stated:
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gued that a stronger argument actually existed for granting pendent
party jurisdiction under the FTCA than under the FELA. The court
noted that FELA plaintiffs could bring suits in either state or federal
court and that defendant railroads were prohibited from removing
such an action brought in state court.8 0 As a result, a plaintiff suing
under the FELA could avoid a bifurcated trial by bringing the entire
action in state court.
In contrast, plaintiffs under the FTCA are prohibited from bringing suits against the federal government in state court. 8 ' The majority reasoned that denying pendent party jurisdiction to claimants
under the FELA was less harsh than the Finley holding, since the
FELA plaintiffs who wished to sue a defendant railroad and pendent
parties could do so in state court.8 2
In his dissent, Judge Beam disagreed with the majority's analysis
of Finley and its denial of pendent party jurisdiction for claims
brought under the FELA.83 Judge Beam argued that the jurisdic-

tional language in the FELA is broader than that in the FTCA.84
Beam noted that the FELA's language "discusses liability resulting
from the negligence of parties other than the railroad."85 Beam
cited a number of district court cases which allowed pendent party
jurisdiction under the FELA.86 Beam concluded that since Finley did

not expressly eliminate pendent party jurisdiction, and since Congress provided non-exclusive jurisdiction over FELA claims, pendent
We see no relevant difference in the two provisions, however. As we
have noted, the FTCA confers jurisdiction over "civil actions on claims
against the United States." By comparison, the FELA provides that "[e]very
common carrier by railroad... shall be liable..." and, further, that "[upuer
this chapteran action may be brought in a district court of the United States
....
" It is clear from this language that the FELA accomplishes in two steps
what the FTCA accomplishes in one: a grant ofjurisdiction over claims involving particular parties, in this case FELA claims against railroads.
Lockard, 894 F.2d at 302 (emphasis and alterations in original).
80. Id. at 303 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1988)).
81. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982), railroads are prohibited from removing
an action from a state court to any federal district court.
82. See supra note 55 (text of jurisdictional grant under the FTCA).
83. Lockard, 894 F.2d at 305-08 (Beam, J., dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id. Judge Beam quoted the following language of the FELA:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between
any of the several States or Territories ...shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, . . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
Id. at 307 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51).
86. Id. Judge Beam cited several cases finding pendent party jurisdiction proper
in FELA cases. Congress did not explicitly or implicitly negate an exercise of jurisdiction over non-federal claims in FELA cases. Id.
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party jurisdiction was proper in Lockard.87

1.

B. Analysis
The Eighth Circuit

The Lockard majority's rule requiring an "affirmative grant" from
Congress had the effect of all but eliminating pendent party jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit because few, if any, federal statutes contain
such a grant. The majority's holding appears to conflict with the ultimate goal of Finley, that "Congress be able to legislate against a backdrop of clear interpretive rules."88 Under the Eighth Circuit's
analysis, if Congress intended a particular statute to confer jurisdiction over pendent parties, Congress would have included language
specifically providing for pendent party jurisdiction.89 This interpretive rule was not part of the backdrop against which Congress legislated. Few members of Congress would have guessed that omitting
an "affirmative grant" from a statute would prevent citizens from filing actions which are based on a combination of federal and state
claims against all the parties in federal court. 90
Why the majority chose such a restrictive interpretation of Finley is
unclear. Certainly, the court had available other, less restrictive alternatives. The language of the FELA is significantly broader than
87. Id. at 308.
88. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. The Court in Finley stated the goal as follows: "What
is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it
adopts." Id.
89. While the majority did not explain what statutory language would satisfy the
"affirmative grant" requirement, more specificity than that contained in the grant
under the FELA is apparently required. See supra note 80 (text of jurisdictional language contained in the FELA). Since the jurisdictional grant in the FELA was found
overbroad by the court, it appears that only language approximating a specific acknowledgment and grant of pendent party jurisdiction will suffice. Moreover, as
pointed out by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Finley, if a statute specifically
granted jurisdiction over pendent parties, then the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction would be unnecessary.
And, as those of us in dissent in Aldinger observed, the Aldinger test would be
rendered meaningless if the required intent could be found in the failure of
the relevant jurisdictional statute to mention the type of party in question,
"because all instances of asserted pendent-party jurisdiction will by definition involve a party as to whom Congress has impliedly 'addressed itself' by
not expressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts."
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
90. Judge Beam argued that the majority's opinion conflicted with Finley. After
citing several cases upholding pendent party jurisdiction under the FELA, he stated,
"I would follow the Supreme Court's direction and adjudicate 'against a background
of clear interpretive rules, so that [Congress] may know the effect of the language it
adopts.'" Lockard, 894 F.2d at 308 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting Finley, 490 U.S. at
556).
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that contained in the jurisdictional grant of the FTCA. Congress
limited the FTCA's jurisdiction to "civil actions on claims against the
United States . . . ."91 In contrast, the FELA states simply that rail-

roads "shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed by such carrier . . "92 The Eighth Circuit could
have easily distinguished the jurisdictional language between the two
statutes and upheld the district court's judgment against the defendant in Lockard.
Even if the court found it impossible to uphold pendent party jurisdiction under the FELA, it should have limited its holding to actions brought pursuant to the FELA. The broad sweep of the
majority's "affirmative grant" rule effectively eliminated the assertion of pendent party jurisdiction under any statute.
2.

Courts in OtherJurisdictions

Several courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the pendent
party issue in light of Finley and have reached different results. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a more faithful interpretation of Finley in Roco Carriers, Ltd. v. M/V Nurnberg Express. 93 There,
the Second Circuit held that Finley permitted pendent party jurisdiction "only if the statute providing federal jurisdiction over the pri91. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
92. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). While Lockard might have been based in part on a
disdain by the court for personal injury suits brought under the FELA, there is no
evidence of this. If the court did harbor antagonistic feelings toward the FELA, however, they would not be alone.
[Ilt is difficult to earmark cases to be removed from the federal docket, because there is no broad consensus on the role of federal courts. There are,
however, some federal claims which seem obviously inappropriate. Among
these are personal injury suits by railway employees under the Federal Employers Liability Act and by seamen under the Jones Act.
I FEDERAL COURT STUDY COMMrrEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITrEE REPORTS

376 (July 1, 1990) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS].
93. 899 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1990). In Roco, the court held that pendent party
jurisdiction was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), which confers admiralty jurisdiction on the federal courts. Id. at 1293. The court distinguished the jurisdictional
language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) from the FTCA's jurisdictional grant examined in Finley. The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) conferred exclusive jurisdiction over " '[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.'" Id. at 1296
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)). The court found this language significantly broader
than the grant for the FTCA, which limited jurisdiction to claims against the United
States. Id. at 1296. The Second Circuit also distinguished Roco from Lockard, stating
that the Eighth Circuit's holding in Lockard "rested on the language of the FELA,
which imposes liability on '[elvery common carrier by railroad' for injuries sustained
by railroad employees." Id. at 1296 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51). This quote omitted
the rest of the jurisdictional language contained in 45 U.S.C. § 51. The full text
quoted by Judge Beam in his dissent in Lockard reveals a broader jurisdictional grant
than is credited to the FELA by either the Roco or Lockard majorities. For a complete
version of the pertinent language of 45 U.S.C. § 51, see supra note 85.
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mary claim can also be interpreted as specifically conferring
jurisdiction over other claims against additional parties."94 This interpretation acknowledged the restrictions placed on pendent party
jurisdiction by Finley. However, in contrast to the Eighth Circuit's
rule, the Second Circuit's interpretation granted district courts some
discretion in deciding whether a particular jurisdictional grant could
be construed as conferring pendent party jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to interpret Finley in Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.95 In Teledyne, the court read
Finley as requiring courts considering pendent party jurisdiction to
examine closely the statutory language and congressional intent of
the respective jurisdictional grant. 96 The court acknowledged that
under Finley, jurisdictional statutes must be read narrowly.97 In spite
of this restriction, the court found that the jurisdictional grant behind the Foreign Services Immunities Act (FSIA)98 provided for pendent party jurisdiction. The court conceded that the FSIA could be
interpreted, "as in Finley," as limited to actions brought against a
foreign state " 'and no one else.' "99 The court found that "unlike
the FTCA, the FSIA extends federal jurisdiction over 'any civil action,' " and that this language excluded the "unspoken qualification
read into the statute in Finley."lOO
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York recently viewed Finley as requiring a three-tiered analysis:
[A] court analyzing a pendent party situation must consider: (1)
whether the claims satisfy the Gibbs "common nucleus" test; (2)
whether the statute conferring federal jurisdiction for the primary
claim "expressly or by implication" prevents the exercise of jurisdiction over the pendent claim; and (3) whether the considerations
ofjudicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants favor
having the court decide all of the claims together.'O'
94. Roco, 899 F.2d at 1295 (citing Finley, 490 U.S. at 552-55).
95. 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 1408.
97. Id. at 1409. The Teledyne court compared the jurisdictional language behind
the Foreign Services Immunities Act (FSIA) with that of the FTCA, examined in Finley, and concluded that the jurisdictional grant underlying the FSIA was significantly
broader. Id.
98. The FSIA provides in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction .. .of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state .
28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a) (1988).
99. Teledyne, 892 F.2d at 1409 (quoting Finley, 490 U.S. at 552). The court found
the FSIA language " 'any civil action' against a foreign state" to be a broader grant of
jurisdiction than that contained in the FTCA. Id.
100. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988) (emphasis in original)).
101. United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1014, 1017
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
This three-tiered approach minimized the impact of Finley on the doctrine of pendent
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The court made no mention of a requirement of an affirmative grant
ofjurisdiction. Applying this test, the court concluded that pendent
party jurisdiction was permissible under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA).102
3.

PotentialRamifications of Lockard

The effect of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Lockard on some litigants within the Eighth Circuit would have been devastating had Congress failed to act to restore pendent party
jurisdiction. For certain individuals, the absence of pendent party
jurisdiction placed a serious impediment to complete adjudication of
their claims. One group of litigants who would have suffered disproportionately were plaintiffs who brought actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.103 Claimants who seek relief under section 1983 rarely have
the financial resources to litigate claims arising from the same incident in both state and federal court. Yet the Supreme Court in Finley
acknowledged that the absence of pendent party jurisdiction might
lead to just such bifurcated trials.104

Unlike the jurisdiction under the FTCA, federal jurisdiction for
section 1983 claims is non-exclusive.1 05 Thus, one could argue that
section 1983 plaintiffs seeking to avoid bifurcated proceedings could
bring their entire section 1983 claim in state court. However, this
party jurisdiction. This analysis is essentially identical to that required by Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
102. A &NCleaners, 747 F. Supp. at 1018-20. CERCIA's jurisdictional grant provides for exclusive jurisdiction "over all controversies arising under this chapter,
without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy." 42
U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The statute, which provides civil remedies for civil
rights plaintiffs, reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-

ing for redress.
Id.
104. Finley, 490 U.S. at 555.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1988) provides for the non-exclusive jurisdiction of
section 1983 claims:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person... [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
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analysis ignores a fundamental goal behind the enactment of section
1983, namely "to afford a federal right in federal courts."' 0 6 Without pendent party jurisdiction, many section 1983 claimants may be
left with an unenviable choice. They might file section 1983 claims
in federal court and jurisdictionally insufficient claims against pendent parties in state court, or they might choose to litigate the entire
action in state court.
Both of these choices have disadvantages. Bifurcating an action
between federal and state courts burdens the plaintiff with the expense of two separate actions. The disadvantages associated with litigating the entire claim in state court are not quite so obvious but are
potentially more serious. Plaintiffs often bring actions against state
officials under section 1983, where the defendants may be high profile state officers who have significant influence on their state's judicial system. An action against such defendants in state court might
decrease the probability of prevailing on the merits. In spite of this,
the prohibitive cost of two separate trials may force a plaintiff to
choose a single, but potentially biased, trial in state court. Moreover,
as with cases arising under the FELA, state court judges are rarely
familiar with the special rules and case law associated with section
1983 cases. Thus, a plaintiff who pursues a section 1983 claim in
state court would likely lose the expertise and experience possessed
by federal judges in section 1983 actions.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Finley, several courts addressed the issue of pendent party jurisdiction with respect to section 1983 claims. The results thus far have been mixed. With
respect to pendent party jurisdiction under section 1983, one court
found that "[t]here does not appear to be any statutory obstacle to
granting jurisdiction." 107 Other courts have resisted asserting pendent party jurisdiction in actions brought under section 1983.108
106. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). See Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1361 (7th Cir. 1985). In Moore, Judge Posner applied this
ideal to the issue of pendent jurisdiction, stating: "Access to a federal forum was
intended to be a right of section 1983 plaintiffs, and would be impeded by preventing
the joinder of a closely related claim against private defendants in federal court
under the pendent parties concept." Id.
107. Figueroa v.Molina, 725 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D.P.R. 1989). Commenting on
section 1983, the court noted that " 'although its ambit is restricted to violations of
the federal constitution, its aim is advanced by allowing federal courts to provide
remedies for injuries that, although derived from other law, share a common nucleus
of operative fact with section 1983 claims.' " Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Comas, 888
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989)).
108. See Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1990). In Stallworth, the court did not extend pendent party jurisdiction to the plaintiff's loss of
consortium claim because the loss did not "represent an injury based on a deprivation of his rights, privileges or immunities." Id. at 838. See also Reid v. City of New
York, 736 F. Supp. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). In Reid, the court stated that by merely estab-
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These divergent views stem from the fact that Finley does not answer
the question of whether pendent party jurisdiction can be asserted
under section 1983.
The Eighth Circuit, has not addressed whether assertion of pendent party jurisdiction is proper when the underlying federal claim is
based on section 1983. However, prior to Finley, the Eighth Circuit
allowed its district courts to assert pendent jurisdiction liberally in
section 1983 cases. In Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,109 a case decided
only eleven days before Finley, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district
court exercise of jurisdiction over a pendent state claim in a section
1983 case.
In Murray, the plaintiff filed section 1983 claims against Wal-Mart
and city officials who detained and subsequently prosecuted her for
shoplifting. There was some question as to whether Wal-Mart officials acted under "color of state law," a prerequisite for bringing action under section 1983. Even if no cognizable section 1983 claim
existed against Wal-Mart, the district court asserted jurisdiction over
Wal-Mart by joining the state claims against Wal-Mart with the federal claims against the city via the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 1o The district court exercised its jurisdiction over the state
claims against Wal-Mart even though the city settled and had been
dismissed from the suit."'I Arguably, if the section 1983 claims were
not cognizable against Wal-Mart, then Wal-Mart would be a pendent
party. Ultimately, however, the court analyzed the case as a pendent
claims case rather than a pendent parties case.' 12
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved of the district
court's exercise of pendent jurisdiction over Wal-Mart.t13 However,
the court went on to find that Wal-Mart officials had acted under
color of state law, thus rendering the issue of pendent jurisdiction
moot. While this decision failed to endorse explicitly the assertion of
pendent party jurisdiction in a section 1983 case, it shows an inclination to allow such jurisdiction in a section 1983 case.
A strong argument exists that the language used in the jurisdictional grant of section 1983 met the criteria established in Finley.
lishing liability against one " 'person' who 'subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen' to the 'deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal' law

...do[es] not affirmatively grant pendent-party jurisdiction over the City, which is
not liable for such deprivation." Id. at 27 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(a)(3)).
109. 874 F.2d 555 (1989).
110. Id. at 557-58.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 558.
113. Id. The court also stated that "even if no cognizable section 1983 action
existed, the district court could still retain jurisdiction over the pendent state claims
against Wal-Mart." Id.
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The jurisdictional language for section 1983 is much broader than
the limited jurisdictional grant under the FTCA. 11 4 After Lockard,
however, attempts to seek pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983
actions in the Eighth Circuit became an exercise in futility. While an
argument could be made that Finley permitted pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 actions, such an argument failed in the Eighth
Circuit because of the "affirmative grant" rule of Lockard.115 Thus,
Congress' statutory authorization of pendent party jurisdiction is
particularly important to plaintiffs who seek relief in the federal
courts of the Eighth Circuit.
Although the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Finley was unnecessarily restrictive, Finley's limitation on pendent party jurisdiction
could not be completely circumvented by the courts. Perhaps the
circuit courts could have maintained the doctrine for a little longer,
but only Congress possessed the power to require the courts to allow
pendant party jurisdiction.
III.

A.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The Federal Courts Study Committee

In 1988, Congress established the Federal Courts Study Committee (Committee).'16 ChiefJustice Rehnquist appointed the Committee members as required by the statute."t 7 The purpose of the
114. Compare supra note 106 (jurisdictional grant for section 1983) with supra note
55 (jurisdictional language of the FTCA).
115. In spite of the broad language of § 1343(a), the "affirmative grant" required
by Lockard is obviously lacking. See supra note 105 (text of § 1343(a)).
116. The Federal Courts Study Committee was established pursuant to the Federal Courts Study Act. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-702, § 102, 102 Stat. 4644 [hereinafter Study Act].
117. Id. § 103(a). The Study Act provides:
[tlhe membership of the Committee shall be selected in such a manner as to
be representative of the various interests, needs and concerns which may be
affected by the jurisdiction of the Federal. courts. The Chief Justice shall
designate one of the members of the Committee to serve as Chairman.
Id. § 103(b).
The Committee consisted ofJoseph F. Weis Jr., Chairman (senior judge for the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals); J. Vincent Aprile II, Esq. (General Counsel of the
Kentucky State Department of Public Advocacy); Jose A. Cabranes (judge for the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut); Keith M. Callow (Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington); Levin H. Campbell (Judge for the First
Circuit Court of Appeals); Edwin S. G. Dennis, Jr. (Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice); Charles E. Grassley
(United States Senator from Iowa and Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice); Morris Harrell (law partner, Locke Purnell Rain Harrell from Texas and President of the American Bar Association in 1982-83); Howell T. Heflin (United States
Senator from Alabama, member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and chairman of
the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice); Robert W. Kastenmeier
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Committee was threefold: to examine the problems and issues facing the federal courts, to develop a long-range plan for the federal
judiciary, and to make advisory recommendations for statutory revisions affecting the federal courts." t8 Congress required the Committee to complete its study and publish its report within fifteen months
from January 1, 1989.119 The Committee conducted an exhaustive
study and called on the expertise of numerous advisors and consultants. 120 The Committee released its draft, Tentative Recommendations
For Public Comment, on December 22, 1989,121 and its final report on
April 2, 1990.122 Included in the report's myriad of reforms was its
recommendation for congressional authorization of pendent party
jurisdiction. 123
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Finley provided the
basis for this recommendation.124 The Committee noted in its draft
that Finley limited the power of the federal courts to exercise pendent
party jurisdiction. The draft was critical of Finley and showed obvious concern for its possible ramifications. While the Committee acknowledged that federal court docket control constituted a worthy
goal, the Committee stated that eliminating pendent party jurisdiction was an "undesirable" method for achieving that goal.125
B.

Reasons for Change

Congress' decision to adjust the requirements for federal jurisdic(Congressman from Wisconsin, ranking majority member of the House Committee
on the Judiciary and chairman of its Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration ofJustice); Judith N. Keep (Chief Judge of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California); Rex E. Lee, Jr. (former law
professor and president of Brigham Young University); Carlos J. Moorhead (Congressman from California, member of the House Judiciary Committee and ranking
minority member of its Subcommittee on the Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice); Diana Gribbon Motz (law partner of Frank, Bernstein,
Conway & Goldman of Baltimore, Maryland); and Richard A. Posner (judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit). See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 193-96 (Apr. 2,
1990) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
118. Study Act, supra note 116, § 102(b).
119. Id. §§ 105(1), 109.
120. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 199-201.
121. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Dec. 22, 1989) [hereinafter DRAFT].
122. FINAL REPORT, supra note 117.
123. Id. at 47-48. Three members dissented from this recommendation: Judge
Levin Campbell, Morris Harrell, and Diana Gribbon Motz. Id.
124. DRAFr, supra note 121, at 69. "Last Term, in Finley v. United States, the
Supreme Court limited the federal courts' power to hear pendent party claims." Id.
125. Id. In light of the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Finley, perhaps the Committee's characterization of Finley's effect on pendent party jurisdiction was too
cautious.
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tion stemmed in large part from a concern over the explosive growth
in the caseload of the federal courts. The increased caseload was
primarily the result of a dramatic rise in district court civil filings.
For instance, in 1960 there were 51,063 civil filings in federal district
courts compared with 239,634 in 1988, an increase of over 400%.126
While the number of federal judgeships has increased, it has failed to
keep up with the increased caseload. The number of federal district
court judgeships jumped from 248 in 1960 to 575 in 1988, while the
average number of filings per judgeship grew from 206 in 1960 to
416 in 1988.127

Perhaps even more ominous than the increase in the district court
caseload was the increase in the docket of the courts of appeals.
However, this growth stems from different factors than does the
growth of the district court caseload. While criminal cases did not
contribute to the caseload growth in district courts,' 28 criminal cases
accounted for much of the growth in the docket of the courts of appeals. In 1988, of 37,524 filings with the courts of appeal, 15,463
were criminal cases.' 29 By contrast, in 1960 there were only 913
criminal cases out of a total of 3,765 circuit court filings.13 0
The Committee's overall mandate to recommend ways to reduce
federal court congestion, delay, and expense's was open to two different approaches: docket reduction and judicial efficiency. Most of
the Committee's recommendations focused on ways to reduce the
caseload of both the district and appellate court systems. The Committee estimated that if its recommendations had been implemented
in 1988, docket reduction would have been 37.2% in the district
courts and 16.6% in the courts of appeals.13 2 With such an emphasis
on docket reduction, the Committee's decision to recommend codification of the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction appears to run
counter to the Committee's goal.t33
But while the Committee's overall goal may have been to reduce
congestion, delay, and expense, t3 4 this was impossible to do without
126. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 30.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 29. The figures for criminal and civil filings actually show a decline in
the number of new criminal cases filed per district judge. However, "this decrease is
more than compensated for by the large increase in civil case filings." Id.
129. Id. at 30. This figure includes post-conviction cases. Id.
130. Id. Criminal cases now account for 40% of the docket of the courts of appeals. Id.
131. FINAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 3.
132. Id. at 27-28.
133. The Committee noted that "[a]bolishing supplemental jurisdiction will force
litigants to bring a wide variety of federal claims into state courts .... " WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 92, at 557. Presumably, forcing litigants into state courts would
reduce the federal docket.
134. FINAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 3.
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improvements in judicial efficiency. The elimination of pendent
party jurisdiction could lead to many duplicitous trials in state and
federal courts. I3 5 Justice Scalia recognized this potential loss of efficiency in Finley when the Court eliminated pendent party jurisdiction
in cases brought under the FTCA.136 Therefore, the Committee's
decision to recommend that Congress modify Finley by codifying
pendent party jurisdiction was consistent with the Committee's goal

to promote judicial efficiency.
The Committee's final recommendation regarding pendent party

jurisdiction was simple: "Congress should expressly authorize federal courts to assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an in-

dependent federal jurisdictional base."t37 The final report
acknowledged that "[a]bolishing or radically curtailing pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction would eliminate some cases [or] claims from the
federal courts," but the Committee recognized

this would be

"unwise" in light of the potential for judicial inefficiency and

unfairness.138
The Report identified the dilemmas faced by some litigants in federal courts as a result of the Finley restriction of pendent party jurisdiction.139 In light of these concerns, the Committee rejected the
elimination of pendent party jurisdiction as a means to control the
federal docket. Instead, the Committee recommended that "Congress ... direct federal courts to dismiss state claims" in situations
135. Without pendent party jurisdiction, many litigants are forced to split their
cases between state and federal courts. See WORKING PAPERS, Supra note 92, at 558.
136. Justice Scalia wrote:
Because the FTCA permits the Government to be sued only in federal court,
our holding that parties to related claims cannot necessarily be sued there
means that the efficiency and convenience of a consolidated action will
sometimes have to be forgone in favor of separate actions in state and federal courts.
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 555 (1989).
137. FINAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 47. The Final Report's recommendation
regarding pendent party jurisdiction is nearly identical to that contained in the Draft.
The Draft recommendation read: "Congress should authorize the federal courts to
assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an independent federal jurisdictional
base but with claims related to the same 'transaction or occurrence.' " DRAFTr, supra
note 121, at 69.
138. FINAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 47.
139.
[A] litigant with related claims against two different parties-one within
and one outside original federal jurisdiction-may have to choose between
(1) splitting the claims and bringing duplicitous actions in state and federal
courts; (2) abandoning one of the claims altogether; or (3) filing the entire
case in state court, thus delegating the determination of federal issues to the
state courts. The first alternative wastes judicial resources. The second is
unfair to the claimant. The third forces litigants to bring a wide variety of
federal claims into the state courts and in some cases is unavailable because
federal jurisdiction over the federal aspect is exclusive.
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where such claims predominate, where "they present novel or complex questions of state law," or where "dismissal is warranted in the
40
particular case by considerations of fairness or economy."1
C.

Codification of Pendent PartyJurisdiction

Pendent party jurisdiction is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.141
In most cases, the effect of section 1367 is to limit a district court
judge's discretion to deny pendent jurisdiction. This modifies prior
case law which recognized pendent jurisdiction as "a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right."142
1.

Section 1367(a): Federal QuestionJurisdiction

Congress removed much of the district courts' discretion to decline pendent (supplemental) jurisdiction in federal question cases
with section 1367(a):
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
43
shall involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.t
140. Id. at 48. Interestingly, the Committee made no mention of limiting its recommendation concerning pendent party jurisdiction to non-diversity cases. This
omission is easily explained. Earlier in the Report, the Committee recommended
that federal jurisdiction based on diversity of parties be severely limited. "Congress
should limit federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship to complex multistate litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens. At the least, it should effect
changes to curtail the most obvious problems of the current jurisdiction." Id. at 38.
Therefore, since the Committee had earlier recommended near elimination of diversity jurisdiction, no need existed for the Committee to specifically limit its recommendation regarding pendent party jurisdiction to non-diversity cases.
141. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). See generally Implementation Act,
supra note 1. Section 1367 uses the term "supplemental jurisdiction" instead of pendent jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction includes both the doctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction. For a discussion of the term supplemental jurisdiction, see
supra note 24.
142. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
143. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a). Read alone, section 1367(a) could be construed as
merely granting district courts the power to exercise jurisdiction over pendent parties while giving them discretion to decline to do so. However, section 1367(c) lists
the circumstances under which a court may decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction.
Thus, if none of the circumstances in section 1367(c) exists and federal jurisdiction is
not based on diversity, it appears that a district court must exercise jurisdiction over a
pendent party. At least one court has noted that "[o]n its face, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)
seems to indicate that a court should decline jurisdiction over a related state claim
only in unusual circumstances. In the present case, however, I need not determine to
what extent the statute may curtail the discretion afforded the courts under Gibbs."
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In general, therefore, as long as the claims against the pendent
party meet the constitutional requirements set out in Gibbs, district
courts must exercise pendent jurisdiction unless a federal statute expressly provides otherwise, the pendent claim falls into one of the
exceptions set out in section 1367(c), or federal jurisdiction is based
on diversity.
To some extent, section 1367(a) removes a district court's discretion to decline pendent party jurisdiction in non-diversity cases.
Thus, the section goes beyond the Committee's intent to restore the
law as it existed prior to Finley,t44 when district courts were prohibited from exercising pendent jurisdiction where Congress had expressly or implicitly negated such jurisdiction in a particular
statute.' 4 5 Now, section 1367(a) prohibits district courts from exercising pendent jurisdiction only when the jurisdictionally sufficient
claim is based on a statute which expressly prohibits the exercise of
such jurisdiction.

2.

Section 1367(b): Diversity Jurisdiction

Consistent with the Committee's recommendation to retain the
"complete diversity" rule as articulated in Owen,146 section 1367(b)
severely restricts the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction where federal jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of the parties:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection
(a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under
Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under
Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.147
The Committee appeared to struggle with the concept of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. On one hand, the restrictions
on supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases contradict the CoinRosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 803 n.6 (D.R.I. 1991). In contrast, other commentators suggest that the changes incorporated in section 1367 did little more than
codify the law as it existed prior to Finley. See Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, supra note
24, at 214-25.
144. DRArr, supra note 121, at 69; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 567.
145. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
146. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 567. In Owen, the Supreme Court based
its refusal to allow the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a third party defendant
on an implicit requirement of complete diversity of parties found in section 1332.
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978).
147. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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mittee's general endorsement of supplemental jurisdiction.148 The
Committee acknowledged that conformity with the complete diversity rule creates unfairness and additional costs in some cases. On
the other hand, the Committee recognized that "despite its complications, the complete diversity rule serves important federal and federalist interests by limiting the scope of diversityjurisdiction."149 In
accordance with these concerns, the Committee identified three alternatives available to Congress regarding the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases.
First, Congress could allow supplemental jurisdiction without a
complete diversity limitation. This alternative would "provide an
easy means to avoid the complete diversity rule."150 In light of the
Committee's earlier recommendation to restrict radically diversity
jurisdiction, it is not surprising that the Committee declined to support this alternative.151
Second, Congress could instruct district courts to deny supplemental jurisdiction where the court finds that a plaintiff has filed a
claim to circumvent the complete diversity rule.152 The Committee
found this alternative undesirable because such a determination
would usually be "impossible" for the court to make.15 3
The third alternative, and the one recommended by the Committee, was designed to "codify the law as it existed prior to Finley."154
The Committee proposed that Congress require courts to deny supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions over claims by a plaintiff
against parties joined under Rules 14 and 19, or to claims by parties
who intervene under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.155 The Committee provided that courts could hear such
claims, however, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice.15 6
Oddly, the Committee said nothing about supplemental claims
148. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 547.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. See supra note 140 (text of the Committee's recommendation to limit diversity
jurisdiction).
152. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 566-67. Section 1367(b) prohibits courts
from exercising jurisdiction over pendent parties when "exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b). In other words, the "complete diversity"
rule, highlighted in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978),
remains intact. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for a more detailed look
at the complete diversity rule.
153. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 567.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 568. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (third party practice); FED. R. Civ. P.
19 (joinder of persons needed for just adjudication); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (permissive intervention).
156. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 92, at 567-68.
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against parties joined under Rule 20.157 The Committee apparently
did not intend to eliminate pendent party jurisdiction in diversity
cases. Whether this was intentional or a mere oversight is irrelevant.
Congress, in section 1367(b), included defendants joined under Rule
20 as parties over whom district courts may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Consequently, with respect to diversity actions, pendent party jurisdiction is subject to the same restrictions as ancillary
jurisdiction.
3.

Section 1367(c): Discretion not to Exercise Jurisdiction

In addition to those circumstances where federal question jurisdiction is expressly prohibited by federal law, section 1367(c) lists four
circumstances in which a court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction":
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. ' 58
The determination as to whether a state claim presents a novel or
complex issue of law is left to the discretion of the district court.
Might a district court claim an issue is novel or complex regardless of
the complexity of the state claim merely to rid itself of the pendent
claim? According to the Committee's Working Papers, the answer
appears to be no. The Committee noted that the Supreme Court in
Gibbs cautioned district courts to avoid exercising pendent jurisdiction needlessly over difficult state law claims. 159 Yet according to the
157.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties), reads in pertinent part:

All persons .

.

. may be joined in one action as defendants if there is

asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
It was the permissive joinder of defendants which led to the issue of pendent party
jurisdiction addressed in Finley and Lockard. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,
546-47 (1989); Lockard v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 894 F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 134 (1990).
158. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (West Supp. 1991).
159. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a
surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if it appears
that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of
the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy
sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals.
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Committee, district courts largely ignored this advice and often
claimed jurisdiction over state claims "regardless of their complexity, novelty, or predominance in the litigation."160 Despite this tendency, some courts may attempt to use the "novel or complex"
exception as an easy out to exercising pendent jurisdiction. Now,
however, the burden is on the court choosing not to exercise pendent party jurisdiction to explain its decision and to identify the complex or novel state issues which it seeks to avoid.
The Committee's Report recommended that Congress direct federal district courts to "dismiss state claims if these claims
predominate or if they present novel or complex questions of state
law, or if dismissal is warranted in the particular case by considerations of fairness or economy."'61 Congress did not direct courts to
dismiss such state law claims, but merely granted district courts the
discretion to dismiss such claims. Congress permitted district courts
to decline pendent jurisdiction if all the claims which provide original jurisdiction are dismissed, or in exceptional circumstances when
"there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."162
Therefore, as long as the claims against the pendent party meet
the constitutional requirements set out in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs,163 district courts must exercise jurisdiction over the pendent
party unless federal jurisdiction is based on diversity or the pendent
claim falls into one of the exceptions set out in section 1367(c). To
what extent district courts will exercise pendent party jurisdiction resupra note 92, at 561 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)).
160. Id. at 561-62.
161. FINAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 48.
162. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c). Section 1367 arguably improves the position of a
plaintiff whose pendent claim is dismissed by a federal court. Section 1367(d) tolls
the applicable statute of limitations for any timely-filed supplemental claim. The statute of limitations is tolled while the claim is pending and for 30 days after it is dismissed, unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. Section 1367(d) reads
as follows:
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the
same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be
tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
Tolling the applicable statute of limitations may reduce the pressure on a district
court to hear a pendent claim. Now a court which desires to avoid exercising pendent jurisdiction due to the presence of one of the exceptions of section 1367(c) may
do so without fear that the plaintiff will be denied the opportunity to proceed with
the pendent claim in state court. Thus, the tolling provision reduces the pressure on
a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a pendent claim which it could otherwise
dismiss under section 1367(c), and thereby preserves a plaintiff's right to proceed
with the pendent claim in state court.
163. See supra note 22 for pertinent language from Gibbs.
WORKING PAPERS,
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mains to be seen. Clearly, this change goes further than merely restoring the law as it existed prior to Finley.
D.

Effects of Section 1367 on Litigation

One way to demonstrate the effects of the codification of pendent
jurisdiction is to determine the probable result of Lockard under section 1367. Since Finley would not have controlled, the court of appeals' "affirmative grant" rule would have been inapplicable.
Most interesting is the issue of a district court's discretion not to
exercise pendent party jurisdiction. For purposes of illustration, assume the same facts in Lockard and assume that section 1367 is in
effect. Further, assume that, instead of exercising pendent jurisdiction over Rosella Ray, the district court declines to exercise jurisdiction because it finds that the claims against Ray raise a novel or
complex issue of state law. Under the facts of Lockard, such a finding
by the district court would appear absurd, because the claims against
Ray were simple negligence and loss of consortium claims. 164 Yet in
such a case, would an appellate court find an abuse of discretion by
the district court for declining to exercise pendent party jurisdiction?
If not, then perhaps district courts will be free to deny pendent party
jurisdiction at their discretion merely by mentioning one of the four
exceptions contained in section 1367(c).
Such a result appears to depart from the statutory intent. Congress intended section 1367(c)165 as an exception to the statute,
which generally encourages federal courts to try related claims in a
single action. The purpose behind the change was to give the district
courts jurisdiction over pendent parties.166 It is up to the circuit
courts to police the district courts to ensure that the exceptions
found in subdivision (c) are faithfully interpreted as exceptions and
not applied as the rule.
If section 1367 had been in effect at the time Lockard was decided,
however, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals might not have had the
opportunity to review the district court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent party. The Eighth Circuit could have reversed the district court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over the
pendent party only if it believed that the case fell into one of the four
exceptions found in section 1367(c).167 Even then, because subdivision (c) uses the language "may decline," the decision as to whether
164. Lockard v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 894 F.2d 299, 300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 134 (1990).
165. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (West Supp. 1991).
166. For an explanation of why courts may not have complete discretion not to
exercise pendent jurisdiction, see supra note 143.
167. See supra text accompanying note 158 (text of § 1367(c)).
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one of the four exceptions applies is made by the trial court. 1 68 For
the court of appeals to overturn the district court's decision to exercise pendent party jurisdiction, therefore, the court of appeals would
have had to find an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the district
court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent party in
Lockard would most certainly be upheld if the case were decided
today.
CONCLUSION

Whether the district and circuit courts will welcome the codification of pendent jurisdiction remains to be seen. For now, the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction has left its troubled past behind.
Because the court of appeals' sweeping language in Lockard temporarily signaled the end of pendent party jurisdiction in the Eighth
Circuit, plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit will be among the primary
beneficiaries of the new law.
It is unlikely that any jurisdictional grant by Congress would have
met the "affirmative grant" test adopted by the Lockard majority.
The court of appeals' strained interpretation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Finley unnecessarily restricted the rights of plaintiffs seeking relief in federal court. Fortunately, because Congress chose to
act, those litigants who under Finley and Lockard faced the potential
costs of bifurcated trials can now try their entire cases in federal
court.
While Congress failed to act in time to help the Lockards, many
future litigants will benefit. Those who will benefit the most are civil
rights plaintiffs, who are typically least able to afford the cost of
bringing two actions in separate judicial systems. If this is indeed the
result, pendent party jurisdiction will once again serve to increase
judicial efficiency and to promote equality in the federal court system.
Thomas Jamison
168. Id.
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